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Abstract
 This study examines the existence of local budget utilization behaviour by incumbents 
who have politically interested policies, since they have motive to attract prospective voters.
This study focuses on 254 provincial and districts/cities in Indonesia which held simultaneous 
regional head election in 2015. It analyses targeted expenditures that have highly visible to please 
voters, and allegedly affect vote-share results, such as budget deficits, total spending, investment 
spending, discretionary funds include its sub components: grants, social aids, and financial aids. 
According to the results obtained, there is no indication of politically driven fiscal policy 
by incumbent candidates in almost all spending categories. However, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between the regions that have incumbents and grant expenditure 
subcategory behaviour. This finding indicates that this category expenditure is still 
popular among incumbents to stimulate citizens and gain sufficient vote-share later on.
Keywords: political budget cycles; fiscal spending policy; simultaneous local elections; 
indonesia.
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I. Introduction
 Existing studies of the existences of fiscal policy behavior that induced by political 
motivation has been developed among scholars both in economics and political science. 
There is an assumption that politicians who run government and eligible to compete in the 
next period election behave more opportunistic.  They tend to reduce revenues or increase 
spending particularly if they are running for elections for the second time. One of the reasons 
the incumbents’ try to attract voter, by sending ‘the good signal’ that reflect their performance 
(Nordhaus, 1976; Roggof, 1990; and Baskaran et al., 2016). Many scholars argue that 
politically motivated fiscal policy behaviour appears because of lack of information by voters 
and leads the political leaders to utilize the budget aligned with their vested interests. Rogoff 
(1990) and Shi and Svensson (2003) argues that asymmetric information leads moral hazard 
and induced politicians to apply opportunistic spending to attract voters.  This fiscal action 
reflects a persistence behaviour in economic policies induced by the timing of elections.
 Mix outcome has raised, whether this political events like elections has effect on 
budget implementation or not. A series of empirical studies showing the importance of budget 
spending when re-election is possible. Galli and Rossi (2002); Chortareas et al. (2016); and 
Klein and Sakurai (2015) show that government expenditure increases around election time, 
in particular, if the incumbents run for the second term. Incumbents will attempt to increase 
their popularity with voters by employing the budget strategically. In other words, incumbent 
politicians may try to increase their re-election probability through budget spending in certain 
budget lines. Specifically, in Indonesia, the local leaders who run re-election are thought to 
increase budget spending. Several studies find that the political motivated behaviour on budget 
spending is present in direct elections and relate to expenditure discretion categories such as 
donations and social assistance that need mayors or regents’ discretionary control (Ritonga 
and Alam, 2010; and Sjahrir et al., 2013). These studies also noticed it has relation with the 
regions that has incumbent and run re-election for the second term. However, after amending 
MoHA Decree No. 32 of 2011 on Guidelines for Grant and Social Assistance sourced from 
APBD to Decree No. 39 of 2012 indicate that regional officers has shifted strategy to keep 
maintaining their image building and ‘good signal’ upon their voters (KPK, 2016).
 This research will focus on the regional public expenditure policy instead of revenue 
side, that indicated has a relationship with election time. The local government has however 
remained reliant on the central government as evidenced by substantial intergovernmental 
transfer funds. In 2015, the intergovernmental transfer budget was 700,4 trillion rupiah, 
seeing a significant increase from 322,4 trillion rupiahs in 2010. According to the Law 23 
of 2014 regarding Regional Government, there are three types of the fiscal transfer budget 
in Indonesia, which are revenue sharing (DBH), general allocation subsidiary (DAU), and 
specific allocation funds (DAK).  Brodjonegoro (2001) and Blondal (2009) also argue that 
the fiscal decentralization process in Indonesia focuses on expenditure decentralization 
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rather than the revenue side. Therefore, this research will give more emphasizes on spending 
behaviour of the local government in election years.
 By 2005 the election system in Indonesia was changed and the first direct elections 
held in all municipalities. The incumbents are allowed to complete their terms which ended 
at different time and years. After conducting and evaluating direct elections process for ten 
years, in 2015 Indonesian government and the House of Representatives agreed to promote 
regional elections simultaneously. Unfortunately, money politics, patronages, and political 
dynasties are still widespread in local politics and fuel corruption. Data from the Ministry of 
Home Affairs until December 2015 revealed that there are 343 of the head of municipalities 
that involved a legal case whether General Attorney, Police Office, or KPK (www.kompas.
com 04/02/2015). Moreover, many incumbents’ family members such as brothers, sisters, 
children, relatives, and even wives are running in elections that allegedly to extend family 
control (www.news.detik.com 22/01/2017).   
 This study will focus on 254 regions conducted election due to there are 14 newly 
formed regions. According to Indonesian regional elections result in 2015, from 98 regions 
that incumbents involved elections, showed that 69.01 percent of incumbents won, whether 
this phenomenon is whether this phenomenon is a political budget cycles presence or not still 
need further exploration. 
 It is important to analyse the sub-national levels of political budget cycles in Indonesia 
since regional governments particularly districts and cities are the closest administration to 
citizens who directly get the impact of their policies. However, although some beneficial effect 
of Indonesian fiscal decentralization on public services delivery (Simatupang, 2009 as cited 
in Muttaqin, 2017), another recent literature found that regional head direct election of local 
government decreased local government responsiveness in terms of public service provision 
(Kis-Katos and Sjahrir, 2014). 
 Another assumption is a politically driven of local budget utilization. It means, 
local budget misuse spending in some categories by the local head government often occurs 
approaching election year (Sjahrir et al., 2013; and Setiawan and Rizkiah, 2017). Sjahrir 
et.al, (2013) and Winoto and Falikhatun (2015) also find that incumbent regions act more 
opportunistic in order to gain voters sympathy. They tend to use the budget in particular 
in “discretionary budget subcategory” more excessive.  Allegedly, they indicate allocate the 
budget without regard to performance background and reliable benchmarks but depends 
on their vested interests (Ritonga and Alam, 2010). It means, the local government budget 
tends to be allocated in “discretionary channel fund” instead of directly related to the society 
welfare improvement. 
 Unlike several studies on political cycles in Indonesia that only focus on the dis-
cretionary spending budget cyclical behaviour induced by election time (Ritonga and Alam, 
2010; Sjahrir et al. 2013; Winoto and Falikhatun, 2015), this study also tries to capture other 
expenditures that might have relationship on the incumbents opportunistic behavior. Previ-
ous studies find that incumbents who are eligible to rerun in election have more ability and 
incentive to maximize their reelection prospect by utilizing some specific budget components 
that have links to attract electorates (Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Sjahrir et al., 2013; Klein and 
Sakurai, 2015). These spending categories are budget balances, total expenditure investment 
expenditure, discretionary funds, grants, social aids, and financial aids.
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 Therefore, this study observes the occurrence of the cyclical economic behaviour 
in local government budget in the Indonesian simultaneous election in 2015. The study 
focuses on 254 provinces, districts and municipalities in Indonesia which held simultaneous 
direct local elections in 2015. Other 108 regions are added to examine whether the political-
economical cyclical also occurs in these regions regardless there is no simultaneous regional 
head direct election was held in 2015. The variety of local elections time implementation 
in each subnational level (provincial, districts and municipalities) expected to enhance 
interaction and identification of politically driven fiscal policies (Sjahrir et al. 2013). 
Meanwhile, in the simultaneous local election, the politically induces cycles might overlap 
with other time effects. The result from this study show evidence that incumbents who seeks 
for re-election utilize more in grants during the election year. They attentively try to broadcast 
their ‘good image’ earlier and get impression from electorates afterwards to enhance vote-
share probability.
 This study organized as follows. Chapter 1 Introduction that discuss the importance 
of the political budget cycles studies and some brief fundamental arguments on underlying 
mechanisms. Chapter 2 This chapter will discuss the theoretical of political budget cycles and 
empirical evidences as well. 3. Data and Methodology will detail variables used in the study 
including sources of the data, and the model used to answer research questions. Chapter 4 
presents the main empirical results and how they relate to the theoretical background exposed 
in the earlier chapter. Chapter 5. Conclusion will summarize the findings and also try to give 
some suggestion for improving work in the future.
II. Literature Review
 Politically induced fiscal policy outcome has closely related to two terms of politician 
behaviour as a motivation basis of politicians, first, opportunistic behaviour models mention 
that incumbent politicians maximize the budge as their opportunity to enhance their vote-
share. The last term is partisan politicians that the behaviour can be shifted relies on the 
ideological elected parties (Drazen and Eslava, 2010; and Klein and Sakurai, 2015). Regarding 
incumbents’ opportunistic behavior, Nordhaus (1975) initially introduced a theory of political 
business cycles by proposing a model in which incumbents would utilize the macroeconomic 
policy (balance deficits policy, unemployment policy, and inflation policy) in order to 
gain electoral advantages. This early model emphasizes that the incumbent intentionally 
would secure re-election by optimizing the vote share expectation. The model also assumes 
that the voters will record and evaluate the incumbent’s past performance. Therefore, the 
incumbents attempt to create the most desirable economic conditions before elections by 
applying expansionary fiscal policies to stimulate economy growth and create “constructive” 
circumstances (Nordhaus 1975). 
 Another concept was introduced by Rogoff and Sibart (1988) and Rogoff (1990) 
when narrowing the scope of discussion from macroeconomic perspective to only fiscal policy. 
This strand of the literature assumes that fiscal cyclical behaviour can be shown by given 
an equilibrium signalling interpretation from the electorate to describe unobserved current 
government performance. This literature assumes that voters have rational expectations but 
have difficulties to monitor the incumbent’s competency level due to asymmetric information 
(Rogoff and Sibart 1988). In other words, in these models, signalling is the driving force behind 
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incumbents’ behaviour on fiscal policy spending that aim to re-run election. Incumbents use 
government spending to increase fiscal policy performance prior to election time to signal 
competence to the electorate. 
 Rogoff (1990) works’ version of politically motivated budget policy induced by 
asymmetric information of voters to evaluate incumbent’s performance correctly. A model 
to describe leaders’ action who have desire to be reappointed and act opportunistically 
to send good signal that they are competence. Voters as the opposite side, wants to elect 
them but have limited information to measure their performance, so that evaluate from the 
incumbents’ previous period performance. This condition leads to ‘moral hazard’ by Shi 
and Svensson (2003), that argue the incumbent candidates that has desire to join re-election 
may act opportunistically regardless of the fact that most electorates know the government’s 
policy, since some electorates are uninformed. The larger the number of electorates that fail 
to distinguish between election-induced fiscal policy manipulations and the incumbent’s 
competence, the more incumbents may profit from boosting expenditures prior to an election. 
In equilibrium, expenditures targeted to particular electorates are higher in an election period 
than in a non-election period. Swing voters will rationally vote for incumbents who provide 
more targeted expenditures even when they know that such expenditures may be electorally 
motivated. 
 Most political budget cycles studies in particular subnational level, the dependent 
variable is a measure of fiscal policies, whether local government spending or revenues. 
Klein (2010) stated that the variable Y of political budget cycles study is fiscal policy (total 
government spending or expenditures on development projects), and the explanatory variable 
is a dummy reflecting an election period. Likewise, Chortareas et al. (2016) and Benito, et 
al. (2012) who have used fiscal variables (capital and current spending, and revenues) as 
their dependent variables to examine the political budget cycles existences in Greece and 
Spain municipalities respectively. The voters have preferences for high level of spending in 
particular the public goods or related to their welfare such roads, transport systems, schools, 
and hospitals (Klein 2010). In addition, Sjahrir et al. (2013) models showed that donation and 
social assistance budget spending would increase the incumbent leader’s popularity among 
the voters. Moreover, it also will enhance their probability when the political budget cycles 
presence (Klomp and Haan 2013; and Ballaguer-Coll et al. 2015).
 Chortareas et al. (2016) approach model that adapted from many scholars to examine 
political budget cycles existence through fiscal variables that include total expenditures and 
revenues, and other vector variables such as a number economic (government subsidies), 
demographic (population) and political (party’s ideology) explanatory variables. Similarly, 
Klein (2010) offers model to examine the existence of political budget cycle through the 
real government spending per capita. He also accounting other control variables for other 
political determinants of public expenditure, such as the former election result of the local 
head’s political party vote-share, the party dummies indicators whether the incumbent’s party 
is the same as the former leaders not only local but also national, and the log population. He 
also proposes the probability of the local incumbent leaders being re-elected through the 
variation in real government spending per capita, and other control variables such as the 
variation of per capita revenues, and the fiscal deficit measurement (Klein 2010).
 Specifically, at the local governments in Indonesia, Ritonga and Alam (2010) find 
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that the allocation of grant and society support expenditure in incumbent regions during the 
election year is higher than prior the elections. As mentioned, Sjahrir et al. (2013) analyze 
the political budget cycles effect for indirect and direct elections in Indonesia and find that 
significant political budget cycles exist in Indonesian districts only for direct election, and 
that the political budget cycles are significantly stronger when incumbents run for re-election. 
Winoto and Falikhatun (2015) investigate the possibility of misuse of discretionary funds 
in local governments’ budget by incumbents before election and find indication that more 
proportion of budget allocation on grant and social aid related to incumbent before the local 
election in 2015.
 Regarding simultaneous regional election, it implementing in order to reduce 
the risk of disruption and disturbance from areas that do not hold elections on that day. 
Moreover, simultaneous regional elections are more efficient economically, more focused to 
capture what local people needs, and easier to be assessed compared to separate elections 
(www.idea.int 14/02/2017); www.globalindonesianvoices.com 26/11/2015; www.netralnews.
com 09/01/2017).  During ten years of direct regional head election implementation since 
2005, around 1,500 regional elections conducted in Indonesia with various completion tenure 
periods of head of regions leading to high cost and inefficiency (http://www.thejakartapost.
com 09/09/2014). 
 Law No. 8 of 2015 mandates that from 2015 to 2018, local elections have to be 
implemented every 5 (five) years simultaneously on the same date throughout the territory 
of the Republic of Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia 2015).  The election on 9 December 2015 
was only one of the three rounds of simultaneous regional elections in Indonesia covering 
269 regions in Indonesia. Based on data from the Directorate General of Regional Autonomy, 
MoHA, regional head elections will be implemented simultaneously in 269 regions which 
consist of 170 districts, 26 cities and eight provinces in Indonesia on 9 December 2015 
(Ministry of Home Affairs 2014). Following the first event in 2015, there have been other 
two rounds after regional direct elections in 2015, which was held on February 2017 in 101 
regions, and followed by the third round which will be held in June 2018 in 171 regions 
(General Elections Commission 2015).
 The current local leaders, whether the governor, the mayor, and the regent can 
be re-elected for the second period and called as incumbent. However, there is an unclear 
definition regarding incumbent in Act on Regional Elections in Indonesia.  Formally, the 
only explanation of incumbent terminology comes from the KPU Regulation No. 9 of 2015 
on Governor, Regent, and Mayor Nomination. Article 1 section (19) states: “The Incumbent 
is the Governor or Vice Governor, Regent or Vice Regent, and Mayor or Deputy Mayor who 
is currently serving.” However, The Supreme Constitutional Court has canceled the Law by 
Decision of The Supreme Constitutional Court number 100/PUU-XIII/2015 mentioning the 
prohibition of incumbent’s relatives is against the constitution and human right. Therefore, 
regarding the incumbent terminology, this research will use the KPU regulation No. 1 section 
(19) definition instead of the further explanation from the KPU formal letter, to analyse the 
relations between incumbencies to local budget expenditure behaviour particularly in an 
election year.
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III. Data And Methodology
 Th is research uses a data set of public spending and defi cits of districts and 
municipalities in Indonesia which held simultaneous direct head local elections over the 
period 2011-2015. Th e unit of observation is the municipality level in Indonesia. Data related 
to local government expenditures was obtained from Directorate General of Fiscal Balance, 
Ministry of Finance report and Government Financial Statistics Regency/City from Statistics 
Indonesia (Central Statistics Agency/ BPS). Th e demographic data for control variables 
includes population and adult literacy rate, also obtained from 2010 Indonesia Population 
Census and its projection, and National Socioeconomy Survey (Susenas) respectively. Both 
data are gathered from BPS. Finally, political data consisting of timing and results of each 
local elections, the incumbents running for re-election, were obtained from various sources, 
including KPU, MoHA, and Perludem.
 Th is study’s hypothesis is constructed based on several previous studies as follow. 
First of all, Klein and Sakurai (2015) study that use the fi scal policy variables including budget 
balance, borrowing revenues, total expenditures, and investment expenditures to examine 
the eff ect of term limits on electoral cycles in Brazil Municipalities. Other studies by Sjahrir 
et al. (2013) and Chortareal et al. (2016) also reviewed the interaction between incumbents 
and opportunistic behaviour by utilizing certain fi scal variables in Indonesian and Greece 
municipalities respectively and adding demographic, and political variables as control.
In this research, I will propose a model to analyse the existences of political budget cycles 
by analysing such targeted expenditures that allegedly have eff ect on electoral purposes. 
Th erefore, this study will adapt framework and model from previous typical model from 
Sjahrir et al. (2013) and Chortareas et al. (2016):
 We estimate equation using the fi scal policy variables on the left -hand side, which 
are include budget defi cits and total expenditures. We also examine the highly visible to 
the electorate expenditures such as investment expenditure and discretionary expenditures 
(consist of grants, fi nancial assistance, and social aid spending).  All dependent variables are 
expressed in logarithms excluding the budget balance in order to capture negative values. Th e 
vector XiktX is control variables representing economic, demographic, and political variables 
that aff ect local budget spending policy. Th e main variable interest of this study is incumbent, 
a dummy variable to capture current incumbents for re-running reelection whether they 
apply an aggressive fi scal policy or not.  
 Moreover, other factor variables are included in this study to control such as GRDP 
per Capita; education rate of the people which is proxy by adult literacy rate (LitRate); 
population size (PopSize) by constructing a variable in logarithms as well; DisctrictArea; 
and Number of Villages to capture the characteristic of each regions. Regarding literacy rate, 
we exclude a demographic variable that represents the percentage of the population under 
15 years old (% Pop < 15), which is not eligible to vote in any elections. In other words, it 
represents adult literacy rate refl ects the ability of people as the voters to evaluate as well 
as watch whether to elect or punish incumbents who apply excessive spending on their 
municipalities (Sjahrir et al., 2013). Th e log population, district area, and number of villages 
added since the adoption of the ‘brand image building’ strategy should become less eff ective 
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as the size of the district’s increase (Sjahrir, 2013; Chortareas et al., 2016). Notice the lagged 
of dependent variables before election in 2015 are applied. It is, therefore, usually to capture 
fiscal persistency over time and the political budget cycle existences (Sakurai and Klein, 
2015). Finally, the variable denotes uijt represents the regression error term.
 This study utilizes panel data, in which each object (districts/cities) has one annual 
budget analysed each year. The unit of analysis is 254 regions that held a simultaneous direct 
election in 2015, excluding 15 newly-formed regions. The studies are also identical because 
every variable can have an impact on the outcome are the same across the five years analysis. 
Furthermore, the analysis is conducted using the same method each year which makes the 
studies share the same effect. Previous studies that focused on political budget cycles such 
as Sjahrir (2013), Ballaguel-Coll (2015) and Chortareas et al. (2016) also used Fixed Effect 
Model. Therefore, Fixed Effect Model is seen appropriate to use in this study, and controlling 
year and municipalities to capture spending persistency approaching election year.
IV. Result Analysis
 Descriptive analysis provides an overview of the basic features of the data that used 
in the research. This analysis also describes the modest synopses related to the observation 
(population or sample) as well as its measures. The descriptive statistics of this study is 
presented in Table 1.
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Incumbent 144 0.58 0.49 0 1
Reelected 99 0.69 0.46 0 1
Adult Literacy Rate 254 94.62 8.05 32.56 100
Population Size* 254 12.60 1.02 9.81 15.08
 The table shows a summary of all variables descriptive statistics that used in this 
study. According to STATA estimation of this study uses unbalanced data, the number of 
each observation will be varying in samples and variables. Total observations are 254 regions 
that held a simultaneous direct head election in 2015. First of all, statistical descriptive above 
shows that the mean value of incumbent is 0.58, which means the regions held a simultaneous 
direct election that has incumbent who eligible rerun in election is about 58.0 percent or 
around 144 regions. Another fact is the incumbent that have eligibility to run re-election 
majority won the first simultaneous regional head direct election in 2015. The percentage of 
the incumbents being re-elected is around 69.0 percent or about 99 candidates. According 
to the table above, the mean of adult literacy rate in Indonesian regions held the concurrent 
election in 2015 is 94.62 percent which is sufficient high. However, disparity of literacy rate 
among municipalities still become obstacles where the lowest rate is only more than 32 
percent mostly in eastern part of Indonesia regions. The descriptive statistics of fiscal variable 
in this study is presented in Table 2.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (1)
Source: Dataset constructed by the author
Note: * in natural logarithm
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 In terms of Regional GDP Per Capita, the mean value of GRDP per capita 
is 3.28 (in million rupiahs) and the standard deviation is 0.75 (in million rupiahs). 
According to the table for total expenditures, the mean value is 13.99 with standard deviation 
of 0.52. Regarding the investment, expenditure has a mean value of 12.5 and the standard 
deviation is 0.58. The summary of discretionary funds category for regions held a simultaneous 
direct election in 2015 are as follows.
 Turning to the regression analysis, this sub chapter will discuss the existences of 
political budget cycles in regions that conducted simultaneous direct election in Indonesia 
in 2015. In general, most of the expenditure variables have positive and significant affect in 
terms of election, whether they have eligible incumbent for rerun election or not. However, 
in discretionary category expenditure shows that in regions that have re-runner incumbents 
during election in 2015 affect fiscal implementation. Table 4 will analyze whether there is 
budget cycles that induced by regional local election in 2015.
 Having captured a robust opportunistic behaviour regarding the finance of 
Indonesian municipalities approaching regional simultaneous local elections in 2015, we 
analyse local head executive behaviour on local fiscal performance.  The main interest variable 
of this study is the interaction between incumbent and election time in 2015 (Incumbent* 
Election 2015) which reflecting incumbents’ behavior on certain budget expenditures 
category during election year. Lagged dependent variables and controlling dummy year until 
three years before election identifies the budget utilization deviation between during election 
year compared to three years before election. 
 Table 3 above shows that Lagged Dependent Variables has a negative and significant 
effect on Budget Balance and Investment Expenditure (both at the 1% level of significance). 
This result supports previous studies result such as Drazen and Eslava (2010), Veiga and Veiga 
(2011), and Winoto and Falikhatun (2015) studies in Colombian, Portuguese, and Indonesian 
municipalities, that mention these certain expenditures increased in election year compared 
to previous election. The table also confirm the persistence in most spending categories such 
total expenditure, investment expenditure, discretionary budget as an aggregation and in 
each category. Discretionary funds category is a total amount of grants, social assistance, and 
financial assistance spending. The above table result suggests that from budget year 2013 to 
2015 has an increased from two years before elections at the 1% of significance level at these 
budget spending categories mentioned. This evidence supports the former parallel studies 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GRDP/Cap* 254 3.284448 0.7540669 0.9678938 5.93629
Budget Balance 254 10.21342 1.362353 5.421271 13.38948
Total Expenditure* 254 13.98715 0.517021 13.07682 15.7288
Investment Exp* 254 12.50706 0.584913 10.85863 14.85243
Discretionary Exp* 254 11.60978 0.8307616 7.304655 13.34736
Grants Expenditure* 254 10.75022 0.71654 7.846889 12.58773
Social Assistance Exp* 254 8.020255 1.716219 2.890372 11.53818
Financial Assist Exp* 254 10.26576 2.119043 5.461873 13.12707
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (2)
Source: Dataset constructed by the author
Note: * in natural logarithm
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in Indonesia that local government will allocate more in this type of expenditure categories 
towards election years (Sjahrir et al., 2013; Winoto and Falikhatun, 2015). 
 The above result also suggest that the incumbent has affect discretionary expenditure 
particularly in discretionary funds spending in election year. The re-running incumbents 
behave opportunistically by promoting spending that need their subjectively discretion. 
Allegedly, this type of expenditures is important for re-runner candidates to beautify their 
self-image to attract the voters. This evidence also in line with the previous studies on budget 
spending electorally cycles mention that the incumbent that desire to be re-elected prefer to 
increases in these types of budget spending sub ccategories (Ritonga and Alam, 2010; Winoto 
and Falikhatun, 2015), by distributing donations and social assistance to their citizens 
(discretionary funds) during election time to attract the prospective voters. Interestingly, by 
disaggregating discretionary funds to detangles grants, social aids, and financial aids, show 
that all these sub components have insignificant effect on the opportunistic spending behavior 
by incumbents.
 Turning to the control variables, we realize that Gross Regional Domestic Product 
per Capita consistently have a positive and significant effect total expenditure and financial 
aids expenditure (both at 1% level significant). It means, standard of living people in observed 
municipalities has positive effect on total expenditure of its government, meanwhile the 
level of citizen’s income has influence on financial aids spending. However, the number of 
populations have insignificant effect on the amount of local government spending regarding 
Table 3. The Existence of PBC Behaviour
Source: Author Estimation
*) In nature logarithm
Denote significance at the ***1% ; **5; *10% levels.
Variables Total 
Expend.
Budget Balance Invest. 
Expend.
Discretionary 
Funds
Grant 
Expend.
Social Assist. 
Expend.
Financial 
Assist. Expend.
Lagged Dependent 
Variables*
0.041 -0.307*** 0.049   -0.061 -0.129*** -0.056 -0.056   
(0.099) (0.072) (0.042)   (0.053) (0.045) (0.057) (0.079)   
Election Total -0.044*** -0.254 -0.161*** 0.218*** 0.706*** -0.177 -0.211   
(0.013) (0.199) (0.032)   (0.067) (0.087) (0.149) (0.141)   
Incumbent* Election 
2015
0.004 0.383 0.017   0.004 0.278** -0.083 0.203   
(0.026) (0.351) (0.047)   (0.100) (0.139) (0.210) (0.260)   
GRDP Per Capita* 0.223** 0.235 0.195   0.336 -0.349 -0.341 2.062** 
(0.101) (0.756) (0.163)   (0.304) (0.596) (0.657) (0.856)   
Adult Literacy Rate 0.001 0.014 0.001   -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002   
(0.001) (0.016) (0.002)   (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012)   
Population Size* -0.046 -11.372* -0.729   -1.728 -1.904 1.000 0.834   
(0.484) (5.986) (0.893)   (1.655) (2.493) (3.880) (3.654)   
2013.year 0.110*** 0.074 0.164*** 0.187*** 0.290*** 0.225* 0.043   
(0.016) (0.175) (0.027)   (0.051) (0.074) (0.124) (0.116)   
2014.year 0.212*** 0.600** 0.294*** 0.445*** 0.644*** 0.202 -0.039   
(0.030) (0.241) (0.041)   (0.072) (0.123) (0.168) (0.185)   
2015.year 0.379*** 0.325 0.521*** 0.953*** 0.566*** -0.122 1.006***
(0.045) (0.366) (0.060)   (0.112) (0.180) (0.238) (0.265)   
Constant
 
12.897** 156.418** 20.041*  32.064 35.792 -2.798 -6.753   
(6.159) (76.522) (11.221)   (20.897) (31.769) (48.935) (46.157)   
N 1448.00 844.000 1447.000   1446.000 1390.000 1331.000 1123.000   
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political events.
 According to these results shows that in one of discretionary expenditures sub 
categories (grants) still popular for the head local government to ‘signal good image’ upon 
their electorates. Another possibility reason why grant subcategory increases in the election 
time in 2015, is because the local governments have to finance the local election. The budget 
spending category for financing election comes from donations or grants expenditure 
subcategory, and it will be more significant in regions that have incumbents (KPU, 2017). 
In this way, an increase of amount in the grant expenditure in election year is inevitable. The 
regulation that mentions management of election activities fund sourced from APBD is the 
Decree of MoHA No. 44 of 2015 on Fund Management of Governor and Vice Governor, 
Regent and Vice Regent, and Mayor and Vice Mayor as amended by the Decree the Minister 
of Home Affairs No. 51/2015. This regulation regulates budgeting, implementation and 
administration, reporting and the accountability of budget utilization.
 Finally, concerning there is no different effect of the incumbency on local budget 
policy in other type of budget components, Drazen and Eslava (2010) suggest that the last 
period incumbents will behave similarly with re-candidate incumbents because of: 1) An 
incumbent who cannot rerun election knows that his decision to raise the budget spending 
will affect his party’s or the incumbent’s preferred candidate reappointed probability; 2) The 
often have plan to involve another election in the upcoming year. Thus, this ‘signal’ will be 
captured by the electorates to examines their ‘high-level competence’. 
V. Conclusion
 This study aims to prove empirically whether there is a budget cycles that induced 
by political motivation in the Indonesian simultaneous regional direct election in 2015. By 
analyzing budget balance, total spending, and spending categories that have highly visible to 
please prospective voters such as investment expenditure, discretionary funds as aggregate, 
and it disentangles: grants, social aid, and financial aid subcategory. The regression results 
show that election time has a positive and significant effect on local government spending. 
However, regarding incumbency influence, there is only a positive and significant effect on 
grants spending. Based on the result, shows that grants are still popular for the head local 
government to reflects their good image upon electorates. However, the facts that the local 
governments have to finance the local election and it mostly comes from grants expenditure 
should be concerned as well.
 The future research is also necessary to pay attention to the previous election 
result to know the effect on the incumbents’ vote-share; the relatives of the incumbents’ 
that involve the election; and political affiliation when it comes to re-election probability, 
since the behaviour might be affect the result. A further research is also needed, to do a 
more in-depth investigation on the rational reason whether the opportunistic fiscal policy 
by the incumbents associated with enhancement of the probability of being re-elected or not. 
Another study related to Indonesian concurrence regional direct election in 2017 and 2018 
is also strongly suggested to examine the sequence of the incumbency factor on local fiscal 
spending behaviour.   
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 Hence, this study results may encourage some policy recommendation. Firstly, the 
fact shows that a high level of budget transparency at municipality will reduce misuse of 
budget occurrence in some certain expenditure. Thus, in order to minimize ineffectiveness 
of budget utilization, we should improve transparency of budget management in all levels. 
At the meantime, restricted and improved the regulation is needed, not only related to the 
executive local government, but also donations allocation for political organization including 
political party. Another policy initiative is the election regulation should be revised.   
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